Abstract. We study the problem of unconditionally secure Secret Key Establishment (SKE) when Alice and Bob are connected by two noisy channels in opposite directions, and the channels are eavesdropped by Eve. We consider the case that Alice and Bob do not have any sources of initial randomness at their disposal. We start by discussing special cases of interest where SKE is impossible, and then provide a simple SKE construction over a binary symmetric channel that achieves some rates of secret key. We next focus on the Secret Key (SK) capacity, i.e., the highest rate of secure and reliable key establishment (in bits per channel use) that the parties can achieve. Relying on the existence of capacity-achieving coding schemes, we propose a multi-round SKE protocol, called the main protocol, that proves a lower bound on the SK capacity. The main protocol consists of an initialization round, followed by repeated use of a two-round SKE protocol, called the basic protocol. We also provide an upper bound on the SK capacity and show that the two bounds coincide when channels do not leak information to the adversary. We apply the results to the case that communicants are connected by binary symmetric channels.
Introduction
In cryptography, it is commonly assumed that parties have access to sources of randomness that serve their randomized algorithms and protocols. It is also common to assume that this randomness is perfect, i.e., randomness is represented as a sequence of independently and uniformly random bits. For example, in the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol the two parties require uniformly random strings to generate the exponents. Noting that perfect randomness is hard to obtain and, in many scenarios, the distribution of the random source is either biased or unknown, Dodis and Spencer [17] initiated the study of building cryptographic primitives using imperfect random sources. They focussed on symmetric-key encryption and message authentication, and showed that in both cases the corresponding sources do not require perfect randomness.
In practice, generating randomness with high entropy needs specialized hardware and/or software as well as access to complex processes that could be hard to obtain in many cases, including when devices with low computational resources are considered. A natural question is then, whether the need for a separate random source can be eliminated from a particular cryptographic task. Obviously, cryptography is not possible without randomness (uncertainty). For devices with communication capability however, channel noise is an attractive resource for providing randomness.
In a traditional communication system, information (randomness) sources and communication channels are considered as two different types of resources. Physical communication channels are noisy and can be viewed as a potential resource to provide randomness in cryptographic systems. Wyner's pioneering work [34] showed that channel noise can be used to provide perfect security in message transmission, and in fact replace the role of the shared secret key in Shannon's model [30] of perfect security. This work started a long line of research that relies on channel noise for constructing cryptographic primitives, and it shares the vision of Crépeau and Kilian [12] that, "Noise, on the other hand, breeds disorder, uncertainty, and confusion. Thus, it is the cryptographer's natural ally. " Wyner's work and, to our knowledge, all cryptographic systems that use noisy channels as a resource, however, also assume that the parties in the system have access to independent sources of initial randomness. In this paper, we initiate the study of cryptographic systems without making this assumption. We consider the case that the algorithms have fixed hardwired constant strings, such as identification strings that are publicly known, and there is no other resource for randomness except channel noise. One can ask whether, in such a setting, a particular cryptographic primitive exists and, if it does, whether it is sufficiently efficient to be of practical interest. The answer to this question would depend on the required functionality of the primitive, and the system description (including the communication environment and the adversary framework). In this paper, we focus on the basic task of Secret Key Establishment (SKE) in the presence of a passive adversary and pose the following question:
The initialization round bootstraps the main protocol by providing Alice and Bob with some pieces of "independent randomness" that is obtained from channel noise. By independent randomness, we mean a random variable that is independent of all random variables accessible to other parties. The randomness is derived from channel noise after one round of communication and is required for executing one iteration of the basic protocol. Each iteration of the basic protocol only uses the fresh randomness derived in the previous iteration. An execution of the basic protocol simultaneously serves two purposes: it (1) generates new pieces of independent randomness for Alice and Bob to be used in the next iteration, and (2) establishes one part of the shared secret key. The basic protocol uses two new primitives that we refer to as secure block code and secure equipartition. A secure block code is a deterministic primitive, consisting of a block code and a key derivation function that provides Alice and Bob with a part of the secret key. A secure equipartition is a tool to derive new independent randomness from channel noise which is hidden in the noisy received sequence. This randomness is independent of the channel input and Eve's view. The lower bound proof relies on the existence of these two primitives.
In each iteration of the basic protocol, the number of derived key bits and the number of channel uses are fixed; therefore, one can associate a fixed key rate for each iteration of the protocol. During the initialization round however, no secret key bit is derived. Since the SK rate of the main protocol is the average number of the final secret key bits per channel use, the channel uses in the initialization round can be amortized over the number of the consecutive invocations of the basic protocol and hence the SK rate tends towards that of a single basic protocol execution. One may propose other protocols for key establishment in the setting considered in this paper; an example of such a protocol is given in Section 1.2. Nonetheless, the main protocol described in this paper achieves the highest rate among the known constructions, hence resulting in a tighter lower bound on the SK capacity.
The lower bound shows that positive SK rates are achievable when both DMBCs are in favor of the legitimate parties, i.e., compared to Eve, the legitimate parties receive a less noisy version of the transmitted messages. More interestingly, it shows that this condition, although sufficient, is not necessary and there are cases where both DMBCs are in favor of Eve, yet it is possible to establish secure shared key.
We also provide an upper bound on the SK capacity by bounding the highest SK rate of a general multi-round SKE protocol. We show that the lower and the upper bounds coincide in the case that the channels do not leak any information to the adversary. This corresponds to the problem of common randomness generation over independent noisy channels, studied in [31] , where the common randomness capacity was derived. In other words, the results in this paper match those in [31] under this special condition.
Discussion:
The communication scenario considered in this paper naturally occurs in real life. All physical channels are noisy and in most cases, in particular in wireless communication, they are easy to eavesdrop. Assuming no initial perfect randomness for Alice and Bob is also natural when communicating nodes do not have additional hardware or access to complex random processes (e.g. processing time in a large computer system). In particular, mobile devices and their communication capabilities, match the setting considered in this paper. Our results show that, in the absence of initial randomness, nodes can start with constant strings such as their pre-stored IDs and "distill" randomness from channel noise.
Our work initiates a new direction for research: possibility and construction of cryptographic primitives when the only resource for randomness is channel noise. We note that converting a cryptographic primitive that uses noisy channel as a resource and allows Alice and Bob to have initial randomness, to the case that they do not have such randomness is not straightforward. As mentioned above, in some cases, the construction in the latter setting becomes impossible and, in cases such as this work, although SKE is possible, efficient constructions that achieve the lower bound or sufficiently high secret key rate, can become challenging.
The lower bound proof given in this paper, uses an existential argument: we do not give a construction that achieves the bound and can be used in practice. However, attempts to design efficient while optimal primitives for secure equipartition and secure block code can be directly applied to the main SKE protocol design to achieve SK rates close to the lower bound. This is an interesting direction for future research similar to the work in [8] that applies theoretical SKE results in [23, 34] to practice.
The SKE construction given for binary symmetric channels can be viewed as a relaxed version of the main protocol where a simplified one-round basic protocol is used only once. The von Neumann extractor plays the role of (secure) equipartition in deriving independent randomness while the combination of coding and universal hashing is to replace the secure block code. Using these computationally efficient yet non-optimal primitives results in SK rates that are well below the lower bound. We further discuss this in Section 6.
Related work
The problem considered in this paper has relations to a number of previous studied areas, in particular, secure message transmission and key agreement over noisy channels, key agreement over public discussion channels using correlated randomness, key extraction from weak keys, and common randomness generation over noisy channels. In the following, we briefly clarify these relations.
Exploiting channel noise to provide security functionalities is pioneered by Wyner [34] who proposed an alternative to Shannon's model of secure communication [30] . In Wyner's model, Alice and Bob do not have any initial shared key; they are however, connected by a noisy channel that is wiretapped and allows Eve to only receive a degraded version of what Bob receives. Wyner showed that it is possible to exploit channel noise to transmit messages with perfect secrecy. Wyner's definition of perfect secrecy is in line with Shannon's definition in the information-theoretic setting, i.e., requiring Eve's complete uncertainly about the transmitted message, given what she receives through her wiretap channel. Wyner's work initiated a long line of research on utilizing channel noise to construct information theoretically secure cryptographic primitives including SKE [1, 14, 22, 23, 29] , Oblivious Transfer (OT) [12, 13, 27] , and Bit Commitment (BC) schemes [5, 7] . In all these works however, access to initial randomness is assumed and removing this assumption will require revisiting the results and examining the existence of the primitives. For instance, secure message transmission in the original Wyner's model will not be possible without Alice having access to a random source.
Maurer [23] , concurrently with Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] , studied the problem of key agreement over a public discussion channel when Alice and Bob have initial correlated randomness. The correlated randomness may be obtained from correlated sources or communication over noisy channels. They determined lower and upper bounds on the SK capacity in this setting and showed conditions under which key agreement may or may not be possible. Key agreement using correlated randomness and a one-way noisy channel has been discussed in [22, 29] and it is shown that Alice and Bob can benefit from both resources (correlated sources and a noisy channel) to establish shared secret keys.
A related line of research considered stronger adversaries, i.e., active adversaries who can tamper with communication over public channels. Maurer and Wolf [25] revisited the results in [1, 23] in the active adversary setting and proved a number of possibility and impossibility results. Followup work considered key agreement (also referred to as key extraction) over public channels when Alice and Bob initially share a weak key [26, 28] or close randomness [18, 21] .
The following two works are closely related to the setting in this paper, whereas neither provides results that are applicable to this setting. Venkatesan and Anantharam [31] considered shared randomness generation over a pair of independent DMCs and acquired the common randomness capacity of the channels. This is the first attempt to design communication primitives with no initial randomness. Authors noted that their results could not be applied to the case that the DMCs are eavesdropped by Eve -the setting that is considered in this paper.
SKE over a pair of independent DMBCs was considered in [3] , where bounds on the SK capacity were provided. The constructions, however, assumed availability of free independent randomness to the parties, without which the corresponding proofs will not be valid. Assuming no initial randomness, one may use the results in [3] to design an SKE protocol as follows. Alice and Bob first execute an initialization round (e.g., using secure equipartition proposed in this paper) to derive the required amount of independent randomness, and then use the protocol given in [3] to establish a secret key. Compared to this protocol nevertheless, our main protocol potentially increases the SK rate up to two times, through iteration. The particular novelty of the basic protocol compared to the protocol in [3] is that, it combines the dual tasks of secure key derivation and fresh randomness generation (using secure equipartition).
Notation
We use calligraphic letters (X ), uppercase letters (X), and lowercase letters (x) to denote finite alphabets, Random variables (RVs), and their realizations over sets, respectively. X n is the set of all sequences of length n (so called n-sequences) with elements from X . X n = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) ∈ X n denotes a random n-sequence in X n . In case there is no confusion about the length, we use X to denote a random sequence and x to denote a realization in X 
denotes the binary entropy function.
Paper organization
Section 2 describes SKE over 2DMBCs and delivers the security definitions. In Section 3, we provide some impossibility results for special cases of 2DMBC setting and an example of a simple SKE construction for BSCs together with an estimation of the secret key rate. Section 4 summarizes our main results on the SK capacity. In Section 5, we describe the main protocol that achieves the lower bound. Section 6 studies the SKE results for the case of BSCs, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Secret Key Establishment Problem
A Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC) (X , Y, P Y |X ) is a communication channel that, for any input symbol X ∈ X , returns an output Y ∈ Y according to the distribution P Y |X and independently of other symbols. A Discrete Memoryless Broadcast Channel (DMBC) (X , Y, Z, P Y Z|X ) is a channel that, for an input symbol X ∈ X , returns two output symbols Y ∈ Y and Z ∈ Z according to the distribution P Y Z|X and independently of other symbols. In the 2DMBC setup, shown in Fig. 1(a) , there is a forward DMBC from Alice to Bob and Eve, denoted
, and a backward DMBC from Bob to Alice and Eve, denoted by (
The parties have deterministic computation systems. We describe SKE in the full-duplex model of communication where in each round Alice and Bob both can send messages. To establish a secret key, Alice and Bob follow a SKE protocol with t communication rounds where, in round r, each channel is used n r times. The protocol is specified by a sequence of deterministic round function pairs, (f r , g r ) t−1 r=1 , and a pair of deterministic key derivation functions (φ A , φ B ) such that
where σ j = j i=0 n i , ⊥ denotes the error symbol, and n = σ t−1 is the total number of channel uses at the end of the protocol. The protocol takes as input a pair, (a, b) ∈ X 
, and V :r−1 E are, respectively, the views of Alice, Bob and Eve, at the end of round r − 1, i.e.,
By view of a party, we mean the randomness that they collect through the protocol execution. We do not include constants and deterministic functions that are applied to the variables in the views, since they do not result in new information (randomness). When the t rounds of communication are completed, Alice and Bob calculate their secret keys respectively as
).
Let V iew E = V :t−1 E be Eve's view at the end of the protocol.
Definition 1. For R sk ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the SKE protocol Π is (R sk , δ)-secure if there exists a random variable S ∈ S such that the following requirements are satisfied:
Randomness:
Reliability:
Secrecy:
Definition 2. The Secret-Key (SK) capacity C sk is defined as the largest R sk ≥ 0 such that, for any arbitrarily small δ > 0, there exists an (R sk , δ)-secure SKE protocol.
Remark 1. The above definition of SK capacity follows [34] and later [1, 14, 22, 23, 29] . It is referred to as the weak SK capacity since it only requires Eve's uncertainty about the secret key to be negligible in "rate". In contrast, in the "strong" SK capacity [24] , Eve's total uncertainty must be negligible. Maurer and Wolf [24] showed that for the settings in [14, 23, 34] , the weak definition can be replaced by the strong without sacrificing the SK capacity. We believe that a similar result can be proved for the setting in this paper, using an argument similar to [24] . We will show this in our future work.
3 SKE in special cases of 2DMBC
Impossibility results for special cases
We revisit a number of well-studied SKE scenarios that can be viewed as special cases of 2DMBC. We argue that, without initial randomness available to parties, SKE is impossible in these cases irrespective of the channel specification.
One-way communication: Consider a case that one of the DMBCs, say the backward DMBC, always returns constant values at its outputs. This is the same as assuming a one-way communication over the forward channel. Irrespective of the protocol, Alice will never have a single bit of randomness in her view and, without randomness, she cannot have a secret key. Note that this special case is essentially the one-way DMBC setting of Csiszár and Körner [14] , with the difference that no initial randomness is provided to the parties.
One channel is noiseless and public: Without loss of generality, assume that the backward DMBC is noiseless and public. For any SKE protocol as described in Section 2, we have X (4)). Eve can simply use Alice's key derivation function φ A on her view to calculate S A and so there will not exist any variable S ∈ S as the secret key that satisfies the requirements in (6) . One can find a more precise argument by studying the upper bound, provided in Section 4, for this special case. It is interesting to note that this argument is also valid when in addition to the one-way DMBC a free "two-way" public discussion channel exists. This is the setting that was studied by Maurer in [23] and was proved to allow positive SK rates when parties have access to initial randomness.
One channel is noisy but returns two identical outputs: Assume that this property holds for the backward DMBC. In this case, X . Nevertheless, this is sufficient to argue that Eve's view includes Alice's view; hence, the impossibility of SKE.
An SKE protocol for binary symmetric channels
Assume that the 2DMBC consists of four independent binary symmetric channels as illustrated in Fig. 1(b) . The main channels from Alice to Bob and vice versa have bit error probability p 1 , while both Eve's channels have bit error probability p 2 . Furthermore, Alice has an all-zero sequence of length m, a = 0 m . We describe a two-round SKE construction that uses the primitives described below.
The von Neumann randomness extractor [32] : This extractor takes a binary sequence of even length and outputs a variable-length sequence that has uniform distribution. For an input Bernoulli sequence
of even length m, where P (Y i = 1) = p, the von Neumann extractor divides the sequence into m/2 pairs of bits and uses the following mapping on each pair
where Λ represents no output. The output sequence is the concatenation of the mapped bits. It is easy to observe that the extractor is computationally efficient and the output bits are independently and uniformly distributed. While the von Neumann extractor does not return a fixed-length output, it can be used to design a primitive Ext : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} l ∪ {⊥} that derives an l-bit uniform string from an m-bit Bernoulli sequence. The Ext function runs the von Neumann extractor on the m-bit sequence Y. If the output length is less l, it returns ⊥; otherwise, it returns the first l bits of the output. The probability that, for an m-bit Bernoulli sequence (with
An (n, k) binary error correcting channel code: We denote the encoding and the decoding functions by Enc :
There are efficient (n, k) error correcting codes that can correct nearly up to t = (n − k)/2 bits of error. When used over a binary symmetric channel with error probability p, the decoding error probability of such codes equals the probability that the number of errors is greater than t, i.e.,
Universal class of hash functions: A class H of (hash) functions h : A → B is universal [9] , if for any distinct pair of inputs x 1 , x 2 ∈ A, the equality h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ) happens with probability at most 1/|B|, provided that h is uniformly at random selected from H. For the purpose of our SKE construction design, we use the following universal class of computationally efficient hash functions, proposed in [33] ,
where h c (x) returns the first s bits of c.x, and the multiplication is over the polynomial representation of GF (2 k ).
Protocol description: Using the above primitives, the SKE protocol proceeds as follows. Alice sends her constant sequence X f = a = (0) m over the forward DMBC. Bob and Eve receive the m-sequences Y f and Z f (m is even). Bob
If U = ⊥, the error Err ext occurs; otherwise, Bob splits the l-bit U into two independent and uniform k-bit sequences U 1 and U 2 , where k = l/2. He calculates the n-bit codewords X 1b = Enc(U 1 ) and X 2b = Enc(U 2 ) and sends them over the backward DMBC; Alice and Eve receive (Y 1b , Y 2b ) and (Z 1b , Z 2b ), respectively. Alice calculates the k-sequenceŝ
The error event Err enc1 (resp. Err enc2 ) occurs whenÛ 1 = U 1 (resp.Û 2 = U 2 ). Next, Alice and Bob use universal hashing for privacy amplification, i.e., to derive keys that are secure against Eve. The secret key is S = h C (U 1 ) where C = U 2 . Bob calculates S B = S and Alice calculates S A = hĈ (Û 1 ) whereĈ =Û 2 . Analysis of randomness, reliability, and secrecy: The above protocol provides Alice and Bob with s uniformly random bits of key. The rate of key establishment is calculated as the number of the key bits divided by the number of channel uses, i.e., R sk = Regarding the reliability requirement (6b), we observe that S A = S B = S holds if none of the errors Err ext , Err enc1 , and Err enc2 occurs. This gives
where Pr(Err ext ), Pr(Err enc1 ) = Pr(Err enc2 ) are obtained from (7) and (8) for p = p 1 , respectively. For an arbitrarily small δ > 0, we can, for instance, choose the parameters m, l, n, and k = l/2 such that each of the above error probabilities is at most δ/3 and so (6b) is satisfied.
To argue the secrecy of the key, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. [6, Corollary 4] For a random
is lower bounded by s 0 and S = h C (U 1 ) for a uniformly random C, then
Since the channels are memoryless, for large enough n, from asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) for the sequences U 1 and Z 1b (see, e.g., [10, Chapter 3]), we can replace the Rényi entropy R(U 1 |Z 1b = z) in the above by the Shannon entropy as H(U 1 |Z 1b ), which we calculate below.
Using Lemma 1 and letting s 0 = k − n(1 − h(p 2 )), we calculate Eve's uncertainty about the secret key as
Equality (a) holds since the randomness in Z f comes only from Eve's BSC noise that is independent of all the variables including (S, Z 1b , Z 2b ). For an arbitrarily small δ > 0, we can choose the parameters k, n and s for (12) such that the secrecy requirement in (6c) holds. Table 1 shows the construction parameters for SKE over binary symmetric channels with p 1 = 0.1 and p 2 = 0.2 when the secret key length is s = 100 and the security parameter δ has different values. According to this table, the achievable SK rate by this construction is about R sk = 0.015 bits per channel use. Remark 2. In each round of the above construction,z either Alice or Bob sends a sequence over the channel. Assuming the full-duplex communication model, Alice and Bob can follow another run of the protocol in parallel, this time with Bob as the initiator. This will double the secret key rate and so, for the values of p 1 = 0.1 and p 2 = 0.2, the SK rate achievable by this construction is around 0.03 bit per channel use.
Remark 3. The aim of the above construction is to show the feasibility of efficient SKE with no initial randomness. We have chosen simple primitives for the ease of explanation. Using more complex primitives in the above construction, one may achieve higher secret key rates.
We provide lower and upper bounds on the SK capacity as defined in Section 2. Let the
Theorem 1. The SK capacity is lower bounded as
where
such that
Proof. See Section 5 and Appendix A.
The lower bound (13) is achieved by the so-called main protocol. The main protocol consists of an initialization round followed by iteration of a two round protocol, called the basic protocol. Each iteration of the basic protocol uses some randomness and generates new randomness for the next iteration, together with a new part of secret key. The initialization round provides the initial randomness for the first iteration of the basic protocol. As the number of iterations increases, the SK rate of the main protocol approaches the lower bound, which is, in fact, the SK rate of the basic protocol. In the full-duplex channel model, the basic protocol proceeds as two parallel instances of a two-round sub-protocol: The first (resp. second) instance is initiated by Alice (resp. Bob) and achieves the key rate Lbound A (resp. Lbound B ), for fixed values µ, P X f , and P X b that are chosen to maximize (13) . Each of the key rates, Lbound A and Lbound B , is the sum of two terms, each corresponding to the key rate achievable in one round of the basic protocol (see (14) - (15)). The real value µ is the ratio between the number of channel uses in the first and the second rounds, e.g., µ = 0 implies no channel use in the first round, implying a one-round basic protocol. The real values γ 1 and γ 2 are to relate the amount of achievable key rate as a function of the randomness obtained from channel noise.
As mentioned above, each round of the basic protocol generates some key rates. The keys rate achieved by the second round depends on the DMBC parameters (i.e., The study of the lower bound for BSCs in Section 6 shows clearly the existence positive SK rates in the latter case (see Fig. 3 ).
Theorem 2. The SK capacity is upper bounded as
Proof. See Appendix B.
The above upper bound also proves the SKE impossibility results for the special cases discussed in Section 3.1. In the case of one way communication, e.g., when the backward channel returns constant values at its ouputs, both terms
equal zero, implying a zero upper bound on SK rates. The same argument can be used to prove impossibility when the backward channel is noiseless and public or it is noisy but returns identical outputs to Alice and Eve. Theorem 3 shows that the two bounds coincide when the two DMBCs do not leak information. The resulting value matches the common randomness capacity of a pair of independent DMCs, given in [31] .
Theorem 3. When the DMBCs do not leak information to Eve, the bounds coincide and the SK capacity equals
Proof. See Appendix C.
The main SKE Protocol: Achieving the Lower Bound
We noted that the bound in Theorem 1 is achieved by the main protocol. The main protocol has 2t + 1 rounds and does not need any initial randomness. The protocol starts with an initialization round (round 0) that provides Alice and Bob with some amount of independent randomness. The initialization round is followed by t iterations of a two-round protocol, called the basic protocol. Each iteration of the basic protocol takes some independent randomness from Alice and Bob and returns to them a part of the secret key as well as new pieces of independent randomness. The independent randomness that is produced in iteration 1 ≤ r ≤ t − 1 (resp. round 0) will be used in iteration r + 1 (resp. iteration 1). The secret key parts are finally concatenated to give the final secret key. In a deeper look, the basic protocol proceeds as two parallel instances of a key agreement sub-protocol, one initiated by Alice and one initiated by Bob. Each instance of the sub-protocol uses a part of the randomness provided by Alice and Bob, and partially contributes to the secret key. More details are provided in Section 5.2.
The main protocol relies on the existence of two primitives, referred to as secure equipartition and secure block code. In the following, we define these primitives, show their existence, and then describe the main protocol.
Preliminaries
Definition 3. For a probability distribution P X over the set X , a sequence x n ∈ X n is called ǫ-typical if
where P (x n ) is calculated as
partitions Y n , and
Block codes are used to promise reliable communication over noisy channels (DMCs). The following lemma shows the existence of block codes, for a DMC (X , Y, P Y |X ), that achieve reliable communication rates up to I(X; Y ).
Lemma 2. For any P X , R c < I(X; Y ), and large enough n, there exists an (n, M, ǫ)-block code for the DMC (X , Y, P Y |X ) with ǫ-typical codewords c i ∈ X n such that M = ⌊2 nRc ⌋ and ǫ = 2 n(Rc−I(X;Y )) → 0.
Proof. See e.g. [10, 20] . We define a secure block code for a DMBC as the composition of a block code and a function that we refer to as a key derivation function. A secure block code can be used by two parties, connected through a DMBC, to generate a secret key securely. 
Although the above definition of a secure block code as a primitive is new to the literature, the work on secure message transmission or key agreement over one-way DMBCs [14, 34] implicitly studies the existence of such a primitive. For instance, one can send a message S ∈ [K] using a secure block code (defined as above), by randomly choosing a codeword in φ −1 s (S) and sending it over the channel. The receiver decodes the codeword and applies φ s to obtain the secure message. The results in [14, 34] let us conclude the following. Lemma 3 indicates that, for the above DMBC, there exists a secure block code that achieves key rates up to I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z). In the following, we extend this result by showing that there are sufficiently many secure block codes such that any X n ∈ X n as input to the channel belongs to at least one of them, with high probability. furthermore, the probability that a randomly selected ǫ-typical sequence X n ∈ X n belongs to at least one of the codes is
Proof. See Appendix D.
An equipartition is used to derive uniform randomness from the output of a DMC, such that the randomness that is independent of the input. We remind that, in the SKE construction over BSCs, we used the von Neumann extractor for this purpose.
The following lemma shows that there exists an equipartition for a DMC (X , Y, P Y |X ) that can derive randomness rates up to H(Y |X) bits per channel use. This implies the noisier the channel, the higher the achievable rate of randomness that is independent from the channel input.
Lemma 5. For any P X , typical c ∈ X n , C ⊆ Y n , large enough n, and R e < H(Y |X), there exists an (M, ǫ)-equipartition For a DMBC, a secure equipartition is used to ensure that the derived randomness is not only independent of the input but also independent of Eve's received sequence. In other words, Eve is uncertain about this random value. 
such that if X n = c and T = ψ t (Y n ), then
The following lemma shows the existence of a secure equipartition over the DMBC that achieves randomness rates up to H(Y |XZ) bits per channel use. 
Proof. See Appendix E.
To describe of the main protocol, we shall use the notion of an inverse DMBC that implies a virtual channel defined as follows.
Definition 8. Given a distribution P X , for a DMBC (X , Y, Z, P Y Z|X ), we define its corresponding inverse DMBC as (Y, X , Z, P XZ|Y ) such that P XZ|Y is calculated as
Description of the main protocol
Let P X f , P X b , and µ be chosen such that the conditions (18) and (19) are satisfied. The conditions can be rephrased as
where α > 0 is a sufficiently small real constant, to be determined from δ in the sequel, and n 1 and n 2 are sufficiently large positive integers such that n 1 = µn 2 , and 1/α = o(min{n 1 , n 2 }); in other words, 2 −α min{n1,n2} approaches zero.
In the following, we define a number of integer and set parameters and claim the existence of secure block codes and secure equipartitions using these parameters. Next, we describe the construction of the main protocol based on the given primitives. Define
We informally describe each of the above quantities as follows. For the forward DMBC, R 1f is the (highest) channel input rate, R cf is the rate of reliable transmission, R scf is the rate of secure transmission, R ef is the equipartition rate (or the uncertainty rate of the channel), and R sef is the secure equipartition rate. Note that R cf can also be viewed as the rate of reliable transmission for the inverse forward DMBC (see Definition 8) . Finally, R scf −1 is the secure transmission rate of the inverse forward DMBC. One can define similar quantities for the backward DMBC.
Each iteration of the two-round basic protocol uses the 2DMBC channel n 1 times in the first round and n 2 times in the second round; i.e. in total n 1 + n 2 . In the second round, Alice (resp. Bob) sends two sequences of lengths n 21A and n 22A (resp. n 21B and n 22B ), where n 21A + n 22A (= n 21B + n 22B ) = n 2 and,
Using the above quantities, we define,
Using (26)- (30) 
be arbitrary bijective mappings.
For given P X f and P X b , define the inverse
and using Lemmas 3, 4, and 6 we arrive at the existence of the following primitives to be used in the main protocol. Secure block codes over the inverse channels (see Lemma 4):
with the key derivation functions φ j s,B , such that a randomly selected ǫ-typical sequence in Y n f is in at least one of the codes with probability at least 1 − e −γ . Secure block codes and corresponding secure equipartitions over the channels (see Lemmas 3 and 6):
} with the key derivation function φ s,A ; furthermore, for each (c f,i , C f,i ) there exists a (Γ 21B , ǫ)-secure equipartition {C f,i (e), C f,i (1), . . . , C f,i (Γ 21B )} with the randomness derivation function ψ Secure equipartitions (for transmission of the constant values) over the channels (see Lemma 6) :
)} with the randomness derivation function ψ A .
Using the above primitives, we describe the main protocol below. The initialization round (round 0): The initialization round proceeds as two parallel instances. The first and the second instances are to derive independent randomness for Bob and Alice, respectively; neither of them, however, produces a secret key. The first instance runs as follows. Alice sends the constant n 2 -sequence X The basic protocol (iteration 1 ≤ r ≤ t): Each iteration r of the basic protocol proceeds as two parallel instances of a two-round key agreement sub-protocol over the full-duplex communication channel. Each instance runs in two rounds, 2r − 1 and 2r, where the 2DMBC is used n 1 and n 2 times, respectively. Each instance receives pieces of randomness from Alice and Bob and returns to them a piece of secret key. Furthermore, the first and the second instances are initiated by Alice and Bob and return new pieces of independent randomness to Alice and Bob, respectively. The new randomness is used in the next iteration of the basic protocol. Fig. 2 summarizes the relationship between the random variables that are used in the first instance in iteration r of the basic protocol. We describe the two instances of the key agreement sub-protocol together as follows. Alice and Bob send X 
In the beginning of round 2r, Alice and Bob respectively calculate
, and
They next use the key derivation functions (in the secure block code) to calculate key parts S The above calculations are to derive independent randomness and secret key parts from round 2r. The following is for deriving a key part out of round 2r − 1. Firstly, the parties calculatê
The quantitiesĴ A ∈ [N A ] andĴ B ∈ [N B ] are used to find which secure block codes need to be considered over the inverse DMBCs in round 2r − 1. More precisely, Alice findsÎ B such that X 
The SK Capacity in the Case of Binary Symmetric Channels
Consider the case that each DMBC consists of independent BSCs with error probabilities p 1 and p 2 , i.e., the special case discussed in Section 3.2 (see Fig. 1(b) ). Following the lower bound expression (13) in Theorem 1, and letting X f and X b to be uniform binary RVs, we conclude the following lower bound on the SK capacity in the case of BSCs, C BSC sk
In general, µ ≥ 0 is a non-negative real number. In the following, we see that only three selections of µ that is µ ∈ {0, M 1 , M 2 } (with M 1 and M 2 defined in (39)) can lead to the lower bound (35). This makes it easy to calculate the lower bound. By letting
we have µ ≤ M 2 as a condition and that
1−h(p1) − µ < 1. Accordingly, we consider the following cases.
This gives that, to maximize Lbound, the largest possible µ should be selected, i.e., µ = M 2 .
Case 2: h(p 2 ) > h(p 1 ). We divide this into the following three subcases. 2.1) If M 2 ≤ M 1 , for any µ ≤ M 2 , the inequality µ ≤ M 1 also holds. From (i) above, γ = 1 and Lbound can be expressed as the following weighted average
Since the first term in the above average is greater or equal to the second term, the average is maximized by selecting the largest possible value for µ that is µ = M 2 .
-For µ ≤ M 1 , from (i), γ = 1 and so Lbound is expressed the same way as (41). This implies that selecting µ = M 1 (the largest possible value) leads to the maximization of the average.
-For M 1 < µ ≤ M 2 , from (ii), Lbound can be written as the following weighted average
Depending on the relationship between the first and the second terms of the above average, the maximum is achieved by selecting either the smallest or the largest possible µ in the range
Lbound is written the same as (42). However, the smallest and the largest values of µ are 0 and M 2 , respectively. In all cases above, either selection of µ ∈ {0, M 1 , M 2 } leads to the maximum achievable rate, i.e. the lower bound in (35) is simplified to
{Lbound}.
Following the upper bound (22) in Theorem 2 for the above setting, we arrive at
It is easy to show that, by selecting X f and X b to be uniformly random, U bound A and U bound B reach their highest values, respectively. So, the upper bound can be simplified as
In Fig. 3 , we graph the lower and the upper bounds, in (43) and (46), for different values of the main channels error probability p 1 and Eve's channels error probability p 2 . Fig. 3(a) illustrates the changes in the two bounds with respect to 0 ≤ p 2 ≤ 0.5 when p 1 = 0.1 is fixed. According to this graph, the two bounds coincide when p 2 = 0 or when p 2 = 0.5. When p 2 = 0 all information sent over the 2DMBC is seen by Eve and SKE is impossible; so, both bounds equal zero. When p 2 = .5, the setup does not leak any information to Eve and using Theorem 3, the two bounds are expected to coincide. Fig. 3(b) graphs the changes of the two bounds when 0 ≤ p 1 ≤ 0.5 and p 2 = 0.2 is fixed. This graph shows that when the main channels are noiseless (p 1 = 0) or completely noisy (p 1 = 0.5), the two bounds coincide at zero and so SKE is impossible. This is expected because in the former case, no randomness exists in the system for Alice and Bob and in the latter, there is no chance of reliable communication. The graphs also show the possibility of SKE even when both DMBCs are in favor of Eve. This can be observed in Fig. 3(a) for values of 0 < p 2 < (p 1 = 0.1) and in Fig.  3(b) for values of (p 2 = 0.2) < p 1 < 0.5.
In Section 3.2, we have provided an example of a simple and efficient SKE construction. For the values p 1 = 0.1 and p 2 = 0.2, the construction achieves the SK rate 3%. As depicted in Fig. 3 , the lower and the upper bounds on the SK capacity for these values of p 1 and p 2 are about 45% and 72%, respectively. This reveals how the example construction of Section 3.2 works far from optimal achievable rates. As noted earlier, one can improve the performance of the protocol by using more suitable primitives. 
Conclusion
This paper has raised the question of building cryptographic functionalities over noisy channels when there is no initial randomness available to the parties of a system. We focused on two-party secret key establishment (SKE) where Alice and Bob are connected by two independent noisy broadcast channels and the channels leak some information to an adversary, Eve. We formalized the problem and defined a secure SKE protocol as well as the secret key capacity in this setting, and showed some special cases of this setting where SKE is impossible. We then provided a concrete construction of SKE when channels are binary symmetric and proved the reliability and the security of our construction. We obtained lower and upper bounds on the secret key capacity and showed that they coincide when the channels leak zero information to Eve; this matches the known results in the previous work. For the case that the channels are binary symmetric, we derived the bounds and argued that there is a large gap between the rate achieved by the concrete SKE construction and the rate proved to be achievable by optimal primitives. It would be interesting to design better SKE constructions with higher SK rates. Our work also suggests the question of the possibility of other cryptographic primitives when channel noise is the only source of randomness.
A Analysis of the main protocol (Section 5)
In this section, we prove that the main protocol can achieve rates up to the lower bound, while satisfying the three conditions, required in Definition 1.
A.1 Reliability analysis: proving (6b)
We define the error event Err, which is true if at least one of the following happens.
-For an 1 ≤ r ≤ t, at the end of round 2r − 1, Alice fails to find (I A , J A ) such that Y -
, which indicates the decoding error in using the secure block codes.
-For an 0 ≤ r ≤ t − 1, at the end of round 2r, Alice calculates U :2r A = ⊥ or Bob calculates U :2r B = ⊥. We refer to this event as E 3 r , which shows the error in using the secure equipartitions.
The probability of each of the above events can be made arbitrarily small, thanks to the properties of the secure block codes and the secure equipartitions used in the protocol. In precise, we have the following upper bounds on the error event probabilities for each iteration 1 ≤ r ≤ t of the basic protocol, assuming that no error occurs in round 0 and all iterations up to r − 1. Regarding the two sets of secure block codes for the inverse forward and backward channels, we have Pr(E Pr(Err) = Pr
By selecting t to be polynomially increasing with min{n 1 , n 21A , n 21B }, tǫ approaches zero for large enough n 1 , n 21A , n 2A . This proves that for any arbitrarily δ > 0 and sufficiently small α, we can find n 1 and n 2 such that 7tǫ < δ and so
A.2 Randomness analysis: proving (6a)
The entropy of the secret key S can be bounded from below as
We hereafter assume that no error has occurred and calculate the entropy of S based on this assumption. Assuming no error implies that each secure equipartition function gives an independent and uniform RV in the domain. In other words, ψ are uniformly distributed and independent of the variables in any round less or equal to round 2r − 2. Since each execution of the basic protocol runs two key agreement procedures independently in parallel, the variables of these procedure are also independent. This implies that, for all (i ) .
and hence, for all (s 
where the last inequality follows from AEP and that d B ) ≥ log(K1B + K21B ) − n1ǫ = n1R scf −1 + n21B R scb − n21B α − n1ǫ.
Using (52) and (57) in (58), we can write H(S) n = t(n1R scb −1 + n21AR scf − n21Aα − n1ǫ) + t(n1R scf −1 + n21B R scb − n21Bα − n1ǫ) (t + 1)(n1 + n2) ≥ t (t + 1)(µ + 1) µR scb −1 + n21A n2 R scf + µR scf −1 + n21B n2 R scb − 2α − 2µǫ ≥ t (t + 1)(1 + µ) (µR scb −1 + γ1R scf ) + (µR scf −1 + γ2R scb ) − 2(1 + µ)α
where µ = n1 n2 and γ 1 and γ 2 are as defined in the theorem. Thus, for an arbitrarily given δ > 0, we can choose α, t, n 1 , and n 2 such that
with Lbound A and Lbound B as defined in the theorem.
A.3 Secrecy analysis: proving (6c)
Denote by V
:r E and SK :r Eve's view and the total secret key established at the end of round r, respectively. 
H(S|V
where the last inequality holds since 2t r=2t−1 . There are 5 terms on the right hand of (61). In the sequel, we calculate the second, the third, and the fourth terms separately and show that they are all arbitrarily small. 
) + H(S :2t
A ) + (n 1 + n 21A )(ǫ + δ 1 ) ≤ n 1 I(Y b ; Z b ) + n 21A I(X f ; Z f ) − log(M 1 M 21A ) + log(K 1 K 21A ) + (n 1 + n 21A )(ǫ + δ 1 ) = n 1 I(Y b ; Z b ) + n 21A I(X f ; Z f ) + n 1 (R scb −1 − R cb ) + n 21A (R scf − R cf ) + (n 1 + n 21A )(ǫ + δ 1 ) = n 1 I(Y b ; Z b ) + n 21A I(X f ; Z f ) − n 1 (I(Y b ; Z b ) + α) − n 21A (I(X f ; Z f ) + α) + (n 1 + n 21A )(ǫ + δ 1 ) = (n 1 + n 21A )(ǫ + δ 1 − α) ≤ (n 1 + n 21A )δ 2 ,
for an arbitrarily small δ 2 . Similarly, one can show 
for an arbitrarily small δ 3 . This gives that (63) 
for some arbitrarily small δ 4 .
The third term in (61) 
The fourth term in (61)
I U
